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Evolutionary psychology and social constructionism are widely regarded as fundamen­
tally irreconcilable approaches to the social sciences. Focusing on the study o f  the 
emotions, we argue that this appearance is mistaken. Much o f what appears to be an 
empirical disagreement between evolutionary psychologists and social constructionists 
over the universality or locality o f emotional phenomena is actually generated by an 
implicit philosophical dispute resulting from the adoption o f different theories o f mean­
ing and reference. We argue that once this philosophical dispute is recognized, it can 
be set aside. When this is done, it becomes clear that the two approaches to the emotions 
complement, rather than compete with, one another.
1. Introduction. By all appearances there is a battle raging for the soul of 
the social sciences. On one side, and in some disciplines the prevailing 
establishment, are social constructionists and other advocates of what 
John Tooby and Leda Cosmides have dubbed the Standard Social Science 
Model (SSSM) .1 Social constructionists emphasize the enormous diversity
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1. Throughout we use ‘social constructionist’ as a label for those who advocate impor­
tant parts o f the Standard Social Science Model. This can be misleading in three dif­
ferent ways. First, social constructionism is sometimes identified (usually pejoratively) 
with a set o f  radical metaphysical theses that call into question the mind inde­
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of social and psychological phenomena to be found in cultures around the 
world and throughout history, and much of the research in this tradition 
has been devoted to describing that diversity—in emotions, moral and 
religious beliefs, sexual behavior, kinship systems, theories about nature, 
and much else besides.2 Advocates of the SSSM are heirs to the empiricist 
conception of the mind as a blank tablet which experience writes upon. 
And while no serious social constructionist would deny that our innate 
mental endowment imposes some constraints on what we can learn and 
what we can do, they believe that most of these consti'aints are weak and 
uninteresting. Thus when it comes to explaining the diversity of psycho­
logical phenomena like emotions, beliefs, and preferences, differences in 
the surrounding culture loom large. Those cultural differences are in turn 
explained by differences in history and in local conditions.
On the other side are evolutionary psychologists who advocate a dis­
tinctly rationalist-inspired conception of the mind.3 According to evolu­
tionary psychologists, human minds have a rich, species-typical cognitive 
architecture composed of functionally distinct systems—“mental organs’’ 
as Steven Pinker has called them—that have been shaped by natural se­
lection over millions of years. Many of these mental organs embody com­
plex, domain-specific algorithms and theories (or stores of information) 
which play a major role in shaping and constraining beliefs, preferences, 
emotional reactions, sexual behavior, and interpersonal relationships. This 
evolved psychology also plays a major role in shaping and constraining 
social institutions. In studying social and psychological phenomena, evo­
pendence o f reality or the possibility o f knowing it (e.g., Pinker 1997, 57). We use ‘social 
constructionism’ for the more limited and prima facie more plausible view that partic­
ular features of human psychology or social life are culturally caused and local in 
character. A  second source o f confusion is that ‘social constructionist’ as we use it 
includes theorists who do not characterize themselves as social constructionists, but 
nonetheless endorse the cultural locality of a given phenomenon. Finally, “ social con­
structionism” thus characterized picks out only one portion o f the more extensive doc­
trine Tooby and Cosmides call the Standard Social Sciences Model (1992, 31- 32). 
Closely enough, then, all SSSM advocates are social constructionists in our sense, 
though not all social constructionists need endorse every aspect o f SSSM as character­
ized by Tooby and Cosmides. Still, we take it that the examples o f social constructionists 
we discuss and the doctrines they hold are paradigmatic examples o f SSSM advocates.
2. See, e.g., Lutz 1988, Kessler and McKenna 1977, Oberoi 1994, Shweder 1985.
3. We use the term ‘evolutionary psychologist’ expansively to include a variety o f nat­
uralistic psychological approaches of the sort sketched below. The term has recently 
been used proprietarily to refer to evolutionary approaches of the sort favored by John 
Tooby, Leda Cosmides and Steven Pinker (Tooby and Cosmides 1992, Pinker 1997). 
This latter group is distinguished by its commitment to the thesis o f “ massive modu­
larity” : the claim that a great many (perhaps even all) mental processes, including core 
cognitive processes, are subserved by domain-specific mechanisms.
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lutionary psychologists focus on commonalties rather than differences, 
and in explaining these commonalties they emphasize the contributions of 
innate, information-rich mental mechanisms that were selected to be adap­
tive in the sorts of environments in which humans evolved.
Advocates of the SSSM have little sympathy with this quest for cross- 
cultural patterns and universal features o f human psychology. The highly 
influential anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, apparently doubts that there 
are any substantive universals to be found. “There is,” he writes, “a logical 
conflict between asserting that, say, ‘religion’, ‘marriage’, or ‘property’ are 
empirical universals and giving them very much in the way o f specific 
content, for to say that they are empirical universals is to say that they 
have the same content, and to say they have the same content is to fly in 
the face o f the undeniable fact that they do not” (Geertz 1973, 39).
Evolutionary psychologists are not much moved by this sort o f skep­
ticism, however. On their view the demand for exceptionless universals 
sets the standard too high. According to Tooby and Cosmides,
Whenever it is suggested that something is “innate” or “biological,” 
the SSSM-oriented anthropologist or sociologist rifles through the 
ethnographic literature to find a report of a culture where the behavior 
(or whatever) varies. . . . Upon finding an instance o f reported vari­
ation, the item is moved from the category o f “innate,” “biological,” 
“genetically determined,” or “hardwired” to the category of 
“learned,” “cultural,” or “socially constructed.” . . . Because almost 
everything human is variable in one respect or another, nearly every­
thing has been subtracted from the “biologically determined” column 
and moved to the “socially determined” column. The leftover residue 
o f “hum an nature,” after this process of subtraction has been com­
pleted, is weak tea indeed. (1992, 43)
On the face o f it, the dispute between social constructionists and evo­
lutionary psychologists has two m ajor and interrelated components. First, 
there is an empirical disagreement about the extent to which all normal 
humans share innate, informationally-rich mental mechanisms that 
strongly constrain our psychology and our social interactions and insti­
tutions. Second, there is a strategic or methodological disagreement—a 
disagreement about the best way to make progress in understanding psy­
chological and social phenomena. Evolutionary psychologists urge that 
we focus on what people have in common, while social constructionists 
think that it is more im portant to attend to the many ways in which people 
differ. We do not deny that there are real and im portant disagreements 
on both o f these points. But it is our contention, and one o f the central 
theses o f this paper, that there is a third, much less obvious issue dividing 
social constructionists and evolutionary psychologists. This disagreement
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is not an empirical dispute about the nature of the human mind nor is it 
a methodological dispute about the best way of studying minds and social 
phenomena. Rather, it is a semantic disagreement (or perhaps it is better 
described as a philosophical disagreement—we’ve never been very clear 
about how much of semantics counts as philosophy). What is at issue is 
the meaning and reference of many ordinary terms for mental states, and 
for other psychological and social phenomena—terms like ‘anger’, ‘dis­
gust’, ‘gender’, and ‘homosexuality’.
We think it is crucially important to bring this covert component of 
the dispute out into the open. When we have a clear view of the role that 
this third component of the dispute is playing, it will also become clear 
that this philosophical dispute can easily be bracketed and set aside. Evo­
lutionary psychologists could easily accept the semantic assumptions made 
by social constructionists—if only for argument’s sake—without changing 
in the least the claims they want to make about minds, evolution, and 
social interactions. Moreover, and this is the other central thesis of this 
paper, once the philosophical dispute has been set aside, the remaining 
empirical and methodological disagreements between social construction­
ists and evolutionary psychologists look much less serious. When the fog 
that the philosophical dispute engenders has been cleared, social construc­
tionists and evolutionary psychologists look less like adversaries and more 
like natural partners.
In this paper our focus will be on the dispute between evolutionary 
psychology and social constructionist approaches to the emotions, though 
we think that much of what we say is more generally applicable. The 
emotions are a crucial case, both because they play a central role in dis­
cussions of other social and psychological phenomena like violence, sexual 
behavior, religious practices, and moral beliefs, and also because there has 
been extensive research on the emotions within both an evolutionary psy­
chology paradigm and a social constructionist paradigm. In fact, when 
reading this literature, it is easy to get the feeling that each side considers 
the emotions one of its success stories.
Here is how we will proceed. In Section 2, we will give a brief overview 
of the social constructionist approach by sketching a few details from 
Catherine Lutz’s (1988) widely admired study of the emotions of the Ifa- 
luk, inhabitants of a Micronesian atoll. In Section 3, we will provide a 
quick review of work on emotions in the evolutionary psychology tradi­
tion and set out a model of the psychological mechanisms underlying the 
emotions drawn from recent work in that tradition. Though there are lots 
of disagreements over how the details are to be filled in, there is a growing 
consensus among evolutionary psychologists on the broad outlines of the 
sort of model we will describe. At the core of this model is an innate, 
evolved system for triggering and sequencing emotional responses, present
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in all normal humans. A nother im portant feature of the model is that it 
allows for quite extensive cross-cultural variation both in the circum­
stances that provoke various emotions and in the patterns of behavior 
that the emotions produce. Since this sort of variation is a central theme 
in social constructionist accounts of the emotions, one might well wonder 
whether social constructionists and evolutionary psychologists have any­
thing left to disagree about.
The answer, as we will demonstrate in Section 4, is yes. For while evo­
lutionary psychologists agree that emotions can be provoked by different 
situations in different cultures, and that they can give rise to quite different 
patterns of behavior, they maintain that the emotions themselves are 
cross-cultural universals. Fear, anger, sadness, and other emotions can be 
found in all cultures. And this is a claim that many social constructionists 
vigorously dispute. M ust social constructionists then reject the sort of 
nativistic, evolutionary psychological model o f the emotions set out in 
Section 3? Here, we think, the answer in no. For, as we will argue in Section
5, social constructionists can maintain that emotions like fear and anger 
are not cross-cultural universals and still accept the evolutionary psy­
chologists’ account o f the mechanisms underlying the emotions, provided 
that they accept what we will call a thick description account o f the mean­
ing and reference o f ordinary language emotion terms. And, it is our con­
tention that, either explicitly or tacitly, most social constructionists do 
indeed assume that a thick description account is correct. But we will also 
note that the thick description account o f meaning and reference is not 
the only game in town. There are numerous alternative accounts o f mean­
ing and reference to choose from, some o f which will not sustain the social 
constructionists’ claim that emotions are culturally-local.
In Section 6 , we will begin by asking which account of the meaning and 
reference of emotion terms is correct, and go on to suggest that no one 
really knows and that the question itself may not be clear enough to have 
a determinate answer. But we will also argue that it really doesn’t matter 
which side is right since it is easy to see how this dispute can be bracketed 
and set aside. Moreover, and this is the essential point, once we set aside 
this dispute over the reference o f emotion terms, it is far from clear that 
any deep disagreements between social constructionist and evolutionary 
psychological accounts remain. The philosophically motivated contro­
versy about universality is little more than a distraction which obscures 
the fact that the findings and theories produced on both sides o f the divide, 
far from being in competition with one another, are actually complemen­
tary. M any people will find our conclusion quite startling since it is widely 
believed that the battle between social constructionists and evolutionary 
psychologists is driven by radically different views about the nature of 
minds, social institutions and hum an kinds. If  we are right, there is rela­
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tively little fundamental disagreement about any of these matters. What 
drives the dispute is a covert philosophical disagreement whose resolution 
is of little moment to those on either side.
2. The Social Constructionist Approach to the Emotions. When studying 
the emotions, as when studying other social and psychological phenom­
ena, social constructionists are primarily concerned to describe the rich, 
multifaceted, culturally-local network in which the phenomena are em­
bedded. Since many social constructionists concerned with the emotions 
are anthropologists, problems of translation are a major concern. Thus 
their inquiry often begins by focusing on the words for emotions that are 
used in the culture they are studying and the problem of how those words 
should be translated. In order to accomplish this task, social construc­
tionists pay careful attention to a number of interrelated aspects of emo­
tion discourse and behavior in the target culture, including:
i) the often very complex circumstances in which people in that cul­
ture claim that they or others experience the emotions picked out 
by various emotion words
ii) the pattern of inferences that are drawn when someone is believed 
to be experiencing the emotion
iii) the patterns of interaction that exist (and/or that people in the 
culture believe to exist) among the emotions and also among emo­
tions and other mental states and among emotions and various 
sorts of behavior; some of these interactions will be within a single 
person while others involve two or more people
iv) the ways in which both emotions and discourse about emotions 
interact with the moral, political and economic lives of the people 
in the culture.
When done well, the detailed “ethnopsychological” accounts that result 
from studies of this sort—“thick descriptions” as Geertz would call 
them—can be fascinating. Part of what makes them so interesting is that 
many of the patterns described are wonderfully exotic, differing in sur­
prising and unexpected ways from the patterns of interaction in which our 
own emotions and emotion language are embedded.
To see how all this works in practice, let us briefly review Lutz’s account 
of the emotion that the Ifaluk people call ‘song’. Song is an emotion akin 
to the one that we call ‘anger’, though in contrast with anger, there is a 
strong moral component to song. In order to count as being or feeling 
song, an Ifaluk must be justifiably angry at another person who has en­
gaged in morally inappropriate behavior. The Ifaluk have an array of 
other terms for types of anger that do not involve this moral dimension:
‘tipmochmoch5 for the irritability that often accompanies sickness, ‘linger-
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inger’ for anger that builds up slowly when one is confronted with a series 
o f minor annoyances, etc. (1988, 157). But they have no generic term that 
picks out all and only these various sorts o f anger (Lutz, pers. comm.).
There are various sorts o f moral transgression that can provoke song. 
Lutz’s account of these reasons or triggering conditions for the emotion 
make it clear how the emotion is woven into the fabric of Ifaluk society, 
and also how very different that society is from ours. One im portant cate­
gory of events that can provoke song is the violation o f a taboo, and 
among the Ifaluk taboos are not in short supply. There are taboos that 
apply only to women (they are forbidden to enter the canoe houses or to 
work in the taro gardens when they are menstruating) and others that 
apply only to men (they are not to enter birth houses). Other taboos apply 
to everyone. Violation o f these taboos provokes song among the chiefs 
who may impose fines or other punishments. On a less public level, song 
is often provoked when people fail to live up to their obligation to share 
(160) or when they are lazy, loud, or disrespectful. (165) From  a Western 
perspective, one o f the stranger features of song is that it can be provoked 
by a sort of excited happiness that the Ifaluk call ‘k e f . “Happiness/ex­
citement,” Lutz reports, “ is an emotion people see as pleasant but amoral. 
It is often, in fact, immoral because someone who is happy/excited is more 
likely to be unafraid of other people. While this lack of fear may lead them 
to laugh and talk with other people, it may also make them misbehave or 
walk around showing o f f ’ (167).
Just as the circumstances that can provoke song are different from those 
that can provoke anger in our culture, so too is the pattern o f behavior 
that a song person may display. In the West, anger often leads to physical 
confrontation and sometimes to violence. But among the Ifaluk, according 
to Lutz, “ it is expected that those who are justifiably angry [song] will not 
physically aggress against another. And in fact, interpersonal violence is 
virtually nonexistent on the island.” (176) Some of the behavior that the 
Ifaluk exhibit when they are song is familiar enough. They may refuse to 
speak or eat with the offending party or produce a facial expression in­
dicative o f disapproval. But other scrag-induced behavior is rather more 
exotic. People often react to song by gossiping about the offending person 
so that he or she may learn indirectly that someone claims to be justifiably 
angry with them (175). In extreme cases they may threaten to burn down 
the offending person’s house (171) or fast or threaten suicide (174).
When people learn that they are the object of another person’s song, 
the typical reaction is to experience the emotion that the Ifaluk call ‘me- 
tagu' which Lutz characterizes as a sort o f fear or anxiety. Metagu can be 
brought on by circumstances other than the song of another—strange sit­
uations is one that Lutz mentions (186)—but the term is not used for the 
sort of fear produced by sudden and unexpected events like the falling of
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a coconut nearby (202), nor is it used for the fearful emotion produced by 
events like the erratic behavior of a drunk. (203) When offenders experi­
ence metagu, it leads them to behave more calmly and appropriately and 
it also often leads them to take some corrective action like apologizing, 
paying a fine levied by the chiefs, or sending some object of value to the 
aggrieved parties or their families. This causes those experiencing song to 
“forget their justifiable anger” (175). Figure 1 is Lutz’s sketch of some of 
the relationships among song, metagu, and her.
As noted earlier, the Ifaluk concept of song, in contrast with the West­
ern notion of anger, is intrinsically tied to moral concerns. One cannot be 
song unless one’s anger is justified. And, according to the prevailing moral 
views, if two people are involved in a dispute, only one can really be song, 
regardless of what the other person may think about the emotion he or 
she is experiencing. (173) N ot surprisingly, “daily negotiations over who 
is song and over the proper reasons for that anger lie at the heart of the 
politics of everyday life” (170). It would, of course, be quite bizarre for 
two people in our culture to assume that only one could be genuinely angry 
with the other and to argue about which one it was. In this way, our 
conception of anger seems quite different from the Ifaluk conception of 
song. Nor is it clear that we have any notion that corresponds all that 
closely to song, since even our notion of justifiable anger can be and often
Person 1 Person 2
Ker — ►Misbehavior 
[happiness / excitement]
Misbehavior -► Song [justifiable anger]
[fear / anxiety] Metagu — Song
Metagu — ► Good, calm 
behavior
Figure 1. Lutz’s account o f the interrelationships among song, metagu. and her. (Lutz 1988 
168)
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is applicable to both parties to a dispute. Metagu also has a  role to play 
in the moral and political life o f the Ifaluk community, since people who 
describe themselves as metagu declare themselves to be harmless and in 
accord with the m oral code of the island (201- 202).
W hat we have presented in this section is only a fragment of the com­
plex cultural web into which the emotional life of the Ifaluk is woven. Our 
goal has been to illustrate the social constructionist approach to  the study 
of emotion and to provide a few examples of the sort o f culturally-local 
facts that play a central role in the ethnopsychological descriptions of 
those who adopt this approach.
3. The Evolutionary Psychology Account of the Emotions. The account of 
the emotions on which we believe contemporary evolutionary psycholo­
gists are converging had its beginnings in Charles Darwin’s The Expression 
o f the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872 [1998]). Darwin pioneered a 
technique in which subjects are shown photographs of emotionally ex­
pressive faces and asked to identify the emotion that the person is expe­
riencing. Using this test Darwin demonstrated that people are capable of 
identifying emotions from facial displays with considerable reliability. 
However, Darwin used the technique only on English test subjects. To 
learn about other cultures, he relied on an extensive correspondence with 
missionaries, traders, and others. Unfortunately, the questionnaires he 
used included some rather leading questions, rendering his cross-cultural 
findings suspect.
In part because o f these methodological problems, Darwin’s work on 
facial expressions made relatively little impact until, in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, a number of researchers, including Paul Ekman, Wallace Frie- 
sen, and Carol Izard began using Darwin’s experimental strategy with 
subjects from non-W estern cultures. The results of this work have become 
quite famous and have made a m ajor impact on subsequent research on 
the emotions. In one series o f experiments, members of the preliterate Fore 
language group in Papua New Guinea, who had rarely if ever seen Western 
faces before Ekman and his colleagues arrived, succeeded in picking out 
photos of Western faces that expressed the emotions involved in various 
emotionally charged stories. The Fore were also asked to show how their 
own faces would look if the events in the stories happened to them. Amer­
ican university students who were shown video tapes of the faces that the 
Fore produced were comparably successful matching the faces with the 
intended emotion (Ekman and Friesen 1971). These results, along with 
much other cross-cultural work on the facial expression o f emotion, have 
convinced many investigators that there do indeed exist universal facial 
expressions for some emotions including happiness, sadness, anger, fear, 
and disgust. In later work Ekm an and others have also accumulated evi­
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dence indicating that some of these emotions are accompanied by char­
acteristic patterns of autonomic nervous system activity (Ekman, Leven- 
son, and Friesen 1983; Levenson 1992).
To explain these findings, Ekman and his colleagues posited the exis­
tence of affect programs associated with each emotion. Affect programs 
can be thought of as universal and largely automated or involuntary suites 
of coordinated emotional responses that are subserved by evolved, innate 
mental and physiological mechanisms present in all normal members of 
the species.
While the immediate consequences of the initiation of an affect pro­
gram are taken to be universal, Ekman and his colleagues recognized early 
on that behaviors further along in the causal stream may be strongly in­
fluenced by culture. One of the most dramatic examples of this was Ek- 
m an’s demonstration that when Japanese subjects were shown unpleasant 
films in the presence of an authority figure they would begin the muscle 
contractions required to produce the facial expressions of negative emo­
tions, but then immediately mask these expressions with a polite smile. 
American subjects, by contrast, made no attempt to mask the expression 
of negative emotions, nor did Japanese subjects when they viewed the 
distressing films alone. Ekman and his colleagues explained these findings 
by positing the existence of culturally-local “display rules” which can over­
ride or radically alter the pattern of emotional expression after an affect 
program has begun to unfold (Ekman 1972). In subsequent work, other 
researchers in the evolutionary psychology tradition have expanded and 
elaborated upon this idea, positing display rules and other sorts of 
culturally-local mental representations that affect not only facial expres­
sions but also tone of voice, posture, self reports about one’s emotional 
experience, and other cognitive and behavioral patterns that follow after 
the initiation of an affect program (Hochschild 1979, Mesquita and Frijda 
1992, Levenson 1994).
What is it that initiates or “triggers” an affect program? W hat gets it 
going? In the mid-1970s Ekman proposed that the system of affect pro­
grams was linked to an innate “appraisal mechanism” which selectively 
attends to those stimuli (external or internal) that are the occasion for one 
or another emotion. Once it is triggered by appropriate stimuli, the ap­
praisal mechanism operates automatically and initiates the appropriate 
affect program. It is not clear whether Ekman ever thought that there are 
some stimuli which the appraisal mechanism is built to respond to directly, 
without the mediation of other cognitive states and processes. But by the 
mid-1990s he had come to believe that just about all the activity of the 
appraisal mechanism was affected by culturally-local factors (Ekman 
1994, 16).
Similar proposals have been developed by a number of other research­
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ers. One sophisticated example of these is found in the work o f Richard 
Lazarus who considers the problem of “reconciling biological universals 
with cultural sources o f variability” to  be among the most im portant issues 
that a theory o f emotion must resolve. (1994, 163) On Lazarus’ theory, 
each emotion is innately linked to an abstractly characterized set of con­
ditions specifying the circumstances under which it is appropriate to  have 
the emotion. Since these conditions specify relations in which a person 
may stand to some aspect o f the physical or social environment, Lazarus 
calls them “core relational themes” (1994, 164). Some examples o f the 
core relational themes Lazarus proposes are:
Anger A demeaning offense against me and mine
Fright An immediate, concrete, and overwhelming physical danger
Sadness Having experienced an irrevocable loss (1994, 164)
Lazarus thinks o f the link between core relational themes and emotions 
as a sort o f innate “ if-then form o f reasoning.” “ [I]f a person appraises 
his or her relationship to the environment in a particular way, then a 
specific emotion—which is tied to  the appraisal pattern—always follows.
. . . The ‘if-then’ formula is, in effect, a psychobiological principle, which 
helps us understand universals in the antecedents o f emotions” (1994, 
165). But, of course, it will typically require lots o f cognitive activity for 
a person to determine that a situation specified in one of the core relational 
themes obtains. And this cognitive activity, which must occur before the 
appraisal mechanism triggers the emotion, will be very much dependent 
on culturally-local beliefs, values, and expectations. W hat counts as a de­
meaning offense in one culture may be no offense at all in another, and 
one often must know a great deal about both  a culture and its environment 
to realize that one is in great physical danger.
Putting all o f these ideas together, Robert Levenson has offered the 
“biocultural model” o f the emotions, depicted in Figure 2, which “reflects 
a confluence between innate and learned influences” (Levenson 1994,125). 
The “innate hardwired” parts of the model—corresponding roughly to 
Ekm an’s appraisal and affect program  mechanisms—are in the center of 
the diagram, between the black panels. Those panels are “ the primary loci 
of cultural influences” and can include local knowledge and belief, local 
values, and display rules of various sorts.
While those who study emotion in the evolutionary psychology tradi­
tion disagree, often quite vigorously, about lots of the details, we think 
that most of them would concede that a model like Levenson’s is on the 
right track—that something along those lines will be needed to explain 
both the innate and universal aspects o f the emotions and the enormous 
cultural variability in the circumstances that elicit emotions and in the 
behavioral and cognitive consequences that emotions produce.
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Recruited
Appraisal Cultural learning: 
Display and feeling rules
Figure 2. Levenson’s Biocultural Model (1994, 126),
4. The Debate Over Universality. From what we have said so far about 
social constructionist and evolutionary psychological approaches to the 
emotions, the reader might well wonder where evolutionary psychologists 
and social constructionists disagree? There is no obvious logical incom­
patibility in the two accounts that we have presented. Quite the opposite. 
An evolutionary psychologist might well take on board much of Lutz’s 
detailed ethnopsychology as an illustration of one of the ways in which 
the black panels in Levenson’s model can be filled in. Lutz describes local 
knowledge, beliefs, and values among the Ifaluk that determine such 
things as what sorts of behavior is offensive and how one is expected to 
behave when angered by an offense of that sort, or what sorts of situations 
are dangerous and how best to deal with that kind danger, and so on. 
And this is just the sort of information needed for “appraisal” of the 
situation and for determining a culturally appropriate response. Social 
constructionists, for their part, could embrace a model like Levenson’s as 
providing a framework for a theory about the psychological mechanisms 
underlying many of the phenomena that Lutz and other anthropologists 
have described, a framework that would explain how innate mechanisms 
interact with culturally-local beliefs and values. But if the two research
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programs fit together so nicely, why does it often seem that the two sides 
are at war? W hat is all the fighting about?
The answer, or at least one im portant part of the answer, is that evo­
lutionary psychologists and social constructionists are inclined to make 
very different claims about the universality of emotions. For theorists like 
Ekm an and Lazarus, the psychological mechanisms between the black 
panels in Levenson’s diagram are innate adaptations, present in all normal 
humans. Moreover, when the appraisal system (whose innate components 
are housed in the box labeled “Emotion prototype” in Levenson’s model) 
determines that the abstract conditions (or the “core relational theme”) 
appropriate to fear or anger or sadness have been satisfied, fear or anger 
or sadness ensues. Since situations that satisfy the abstract conditions are 
present in all cultures (though these situations may be quite different in 
different cultures), people in all cultures will experience these emotions. 
Indeed, since evolutionary psychologists maintain that some o f the mech­
anisms in models like Levenson’s are homologous to mechanisms in other 
species, they are not at all uncomfortable about attributing some emotions 
to members of other species (Lazarus 1994, 170).
Social constructionists, for the most part, will have none o f this. For 
them, emotions are culturally-local phenomena, and thus people in very 
different cultures typically have very different emotions. Song and metagu 
are Ifaluk emotions which outsiders do not experience. Amae is a Japanese 
emotion that is unknown (or at least unrecognized) in the W est.4 And 
accidie is an emotion that once was widespread in the West but now has 
disappeared .5 Moreover, it is not just exotic emotions like metagu or amae 
that social constructionists have claimed to be culturally-local. They make 
much the same claim for emotions that are commonplace in our own 
culture. So, for example, Jean Briggs (1970) claims that anger is unknown 
among the Inuit, and Averill agrees that “anger as a specific emotion” is 
not “universal across all cultures” (1994, 143; italics in original). Robert 
Levy (1984) suggests that sadness is unknown amongst Tahitians. And, 
perhaps most radically o f all, R ichard Shweder (1994) maintains not only 
that there are no universal emotions, but also tha t there may well be some 
cultures in which there are no emotions at all!
4. H arre m aintains that “The Japanese . . .  create and sustain an emotion, amae, quite 
distinct from  anything found in the adult repertoire o f W estern cultures” (1986, 10). 
The Japanese psychiatrist Doi characterizes amae as “ a sense o f helplessness and the 
desire to be loved.” (Quoted in M orsbach and Tyler 1986, 290.)
5. H arre and Finlay-Jones 1986. H arre writes: “ I offer accidie as an example o f an 
obsolete emotion, since I think m odern people do not associate any specific emotion 
with laziness or procrastination in the carrying ou t o f tasks tha t duty dem ands.. . . The 
basic idea o f accidie was boredom , dejection or even disgust with fulfilling one’s reli­
gious duty” (221).
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5. The Philosophical Origin of the Dispute. W hat is going on here? How 
could researchers whose theories appear to complement each other so 
nicely disagree so sharply about the universality of emotions? Since they 
have no fundamental disagreements about the psychological mechanisms 
underlying the emotions6 or about the important role that culturally-local 
beliefs, preferences, and values play in people’s emotional lives, why are 
they at loggerheads about the cultural locality of emotions? The answer, 
we maintain, or at least one very important part of the answer, is that 
social constructionists and evolutionary psychologists have a deep though 
largely hidden philosophical disagreement—a disagreement about the 
meaning and the reference of the emotion terms that ordinary folk use, 
words like ‘anger’, ‘metagu’, ‘fear’, and ‘song’. To make the point, we will 
begin by sketching one version of what is perhaps the most widely held 
view, among philosophers, about the meaning and reference of terms 
about mental states. We will then argue that if one held this view one 
might agree that Levenson’s model (or something very like it) was the 
correct account of the psychological mechanisms underlying the emotions, 
and still insist that emotions are culturally-local.
The account of the meaning of mental state terms that we will present 
is a version of what is sometimes called analytic functionalism, though for 
reasons that will soon be obvious, we prefer to call it the description theory. 
Views like it have been endorsed by many philosophers, most notably 
David Lewis. As we view the description theory, it makes three interrelated 
claims. The first is that the mental state terms of ordinary language can 
be treated as theoretical terms. The second is that theoretical terms are 
implicitly defined by the theory in which they are embedded. Building on 
a strategy first proposed by Ramsey, Lewis showed how the implicit def­
inition that a theory provides for its theoretical terms can be turned into 
an explicit definition in the form of a definite description of the theoretical 
entities being defined.7 There is an important sense in which the implicit 
definitions provided by a theory are holistic since the theory implicitly 
defines all its theoretical terms in one fell swoop, and in the definite de­
scriptions that explicitly define each theoretical term, the entire theory 
plays a role in determining the content of the description. The third claim 
of the description theory is that the theory which implicitly defines ordi­
nary mental state terms is commonsense (or “folk”) psychology, which 
Lewis characterizes as our “extensive, shared understanding of how we 
work mentally”—an understanding that “is common knowledge among
6. Indeed, social constructionists rarely say anything at all about the psychological and 
physiological mechanisms that subserve emotions, though they do not deny the exis­
tence o f such mechanisms (see, e.g., Lutz 1988, 210).
7. For further details, see Lewis 1970, 1972, or Stich 1996, 74ff.
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us” (1994, 416). On Lewis’s view, our commonsense psychological theory 
implicitly defines all of our ordinary language mental state terms, includ­
ing terms for the basic propositional attitudes (like ‘belief and ‘desire’), 
terms for qualitative states (like ‘pain’), and terms for the emotions. Thus 
mental state concepts are, to  use David Arm strong’s memorable phrase, 
“package deal concepts” (1968, 253). If  Lewis’s description theory, or 
something close to it, is the correct theory about the meaning o f ordinary 
mental state terms, then a culture’s folk psychological theory implicitly 
defines their emotion terms, and to fully understand the meaning of one 
ordinary language emotion term in a culture requires knowing the mean­
ings o f all the others.
The ethnopsychological accounts provided by researchers like Lutz are 
intended inter alia to describe part o f the folk psychology o f the culture 
being studied. The beliefs about the causes, effects, and moral implications 
of emotions that Lutz reports are common knowledge (or at least common 
belief) among the Ifaluk. But how much o f this belief structure are we to 
count as part of the Ifaluk’s commonsense psychology, and thus as con­
tributing to the meaning o f their emotion terms? Lewis offers little guid­
ance here, and opinions may differ. Those who would include within the 
purview of commonsense psychology only a relatively small part o f an 
ethnopsychology like the one Lutz offers adopt what we propose to call 
an austere account of folk psychology, while those who would include 
much more of a Lutz-style ethnopsychology within folk psychology ad­
vocate what we shall call an opulent view o f folk psychology .8 This ter­
minology can be extended, in an obvious way, to  apply to description 
theories o f meaning as well. An opulent description theory is one that m ain­
tains that a great deal o f ethnopsychology contributes to the meaning of 
mental state terms, while an austere description theory holds that only a 
much smaller part o f ethnopsychology is relevant to  the meaning o f these 
terms.
So much for the meaning of mental state terms. Now what about their 
reference? To what things in the world do these terms refer? Since the 
explicit definitions of mental state terms, on a theory like Lewis’s, take 
the form of definite descriptions, the most obvious proposal is that the 
terms refer to those things in the world that satisfy the descriptions—the 
things the descriptions are true of. But, as Lewis noted long ago (1972, 
21 Off.), this would be a  rather extreme doctrine, since if any aspect o f a 
folk psychological theory turned out to be mistaken, then all the mental 
state terms that the theory implicitly defined would end up referring to
8. The terms ‘opulent’ and ‘austere’ are borrowed from Horgan and Graham 1990, 
though the meanings we have assigned them are not quite the ones that Horgan and 
Graham propose.
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nothing at all. The remedy, Lewis proposed, is to require that the referents 
of mental state terms more or less satisfy the descriptions provided by folk 
theory. But how much is that, exactly? The answer, of course, is that 
Lewis’s proposal is vague, and different theorists may wish to diminish 
the vagueness by insisting on a more or less stringent standard. On what 
we will call the high accuracy end of the spectrum are those who insist that 
a mental state term refers to a state only if most of what folk psychology 
says about states of that kind is true of the state in question. On the low 
accuracy end of the spectrum are those who will allow much more error 
in folk psychology before concluding that the terms of folk psychology do 
not refer. One final bit of terminology: We shall use the term thick de­
scription theory for accounts that combine an opulent description theory 
of the meaning of mental state terms with a high accuracy theory of ref­
erence for those terms.
W hat does all of this have to do with the dispute between social con­
structionists and evolutionary psychologists? To see the connection, let’s 
assume that a theorist has adopted a thick description theory for the mean­
ing and reference of emotion terms. What might such a theorist conclude 
about the universality or cultural locality of emotions? Lutz and her fellow 
ethnopsychologists tell us a great deal about the common knowledge 
about mental states that people in a culture share. Among the Ifaluk, for 
example, it is common knowledge that if a man comes into the birthing 
house, or if a woman works in the taro gardens when she is menstruating, 
it will provoke song in those who know about it. And it is common knowl­
edge that when one realizes one is the object of someone’s song, one typ­
ically experiences metagu. On an opulent description theory, these and 
many other similar claims are part of the folk psychological knowledge of 
the Ifaluk and thus they contribute to the meaning of ‘song’ and ‘m etagu. 
Moreover, on a thick description account of reference, which requires high 
accuracy, most of these claims must be true of a mental state if it is to 
count as an instance of song or metagu. But, of course, in our culture there 
is no mental state that satisfies (or comes close to satisfying) the thick 
description that Lutz provides for song and metagu. If  we learn that some­
one we know has worked in a taro garden while menstruating, it provokes 
no emotion at all. So there is no mental state in our culture that counts as 
an instance of song. Song does not exist here.
Much the same applies in the opposite direction. It is common knowl­
edge in our culture that if someone burns the national flag, shouts racial 
epithets, reaches out and touches a stranger, or gives someone “the fin­
ger,” it is likely to provoke anger in those around him, and that that anger 
will often lead to a heated exchange of words and occasionally to physical 
confrontation and violence. On an opulent account, these and many simi­
lar commonly-known facts are part of our folk psychological theory and
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thus part of the meaning o f our term ‘anger’. For a thick description 
theorist, most of them m ust be true of a mental state if that state is to 
count as an instance of anger. But situations like these would not provoke 
any emotion among the Ifaluk, and (if Lutz is right) no mental state there 
is likely to lead to violence. So, if one accepts a thick description account 
o f the reference o f emotion terms, it follows that among the Ifaluk, anger 
does not exist.
It is im portant to note that the argument leading to these conclusions 
is quite independent o f any views one might have about the psychological 
mechanisms underlying the emotions. All that m atters is that emotion 
terms get their meaning from the relevant folk psychological theory, that 
folk theories are construed opulently and differ substantially in different 
cultures, and that most of what the folk theory says about a state must be 
true if the state is to count as an instance of the emotion in question.
W hat we have argued so far is that i f  one accepted a thick description 
account of the meaning and reference o f emotion terms, then in light of 
the facts that Lutz and others report one should conclude that the emo­
tions denoted by commonsense emotion terms are culturally-local. But is 
this what leads social constructionists to this conclusion? D o they accept 
a thick description theory? Here, we must admit, the answer is less than 
clear cut. The social constructionist anthropologists and psychologists 
who study the emotions rarely set out and defend their semantic views in 
any systematic way, nor do they pay careful attention to the distinctions 
between meaning and reference or use and mention that are so central to 
philosophical discussion. Still, we think there is good reason to suspect 
that something somewhere in the vicinity o f the thick description theory 
is indeed playing an im portant role in the thinking of many social con­
structionists. Consider, for example, the following passage from Shweder:
Across languages, the range of implications, suggestions, and con­
notations of psychological state terms do not easily map, at least not 
lexically, and to adequately understand the meaning of the terms in 
either language is to understand a good deal about different local 
systems of values and particular ways of life. Under such circum­
stances of hazardous lexical mapping, any strong claim about the dis­
tribution around the world o f the “emotions,” as we define them, is 
bound to be controversial. (1994, 33-34; italics and quotation marks 
in the original)
Since Shweder thinks that understanding the meaning of psychological 
state terms requires understanding a good deal about local values and ways 
of life, and since he takes this to  be relevant to the distribution o f the emo­
tions themselves, we don’t think it is too much o f a stretch to  see something 
like a thick description theory hovering in the wings. This impression is re­
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inforced by another passage in which Shweder invokes the same “package 
deal” metaphor that Armstrong used in one of the earliest formulations of 
the description theory (or “analytic functionalism”) (1994, 36).
Similar ideas about meaning can be found in Lutz:
Emotion words are treated here as coalescences of complex ethno- 
theoretical ideas about the nature of self and social interaction. . . . 
To understand the meaning of an emotion word is to be able to en­
visage (and perhaps to find oneself able to participate in) a compli­
cated scene with actors, actions, interpersonal relationships in a par­
ticular state of repair, moral points of view, facial expressions, 
personal and social goals, and sequences of events. (1988, 10)
Here again we think it is plausible to think that if Lutz were to recast these 
ideas in the vocabulary favored by analytic philosophers, the result would 
bear more than a passing resemblance to the thick description theory.
Now what about those on the other side—the evolutionary psycholo­
gists who champion a “biosocial” model—what account of meaning and 
reference do they accept? It is impossible to give a positive answer to this 
question, since the evolutionary psychologists who study emotions say 
little about semantics. However, it is possible to give a negative answer. 
Since theorists in this tradition insist that emotions like fear and anger are 
to be found in all human cultures and probably in many other species as 
well, and since they recognize that there are significant cross-cultural dif­
ferences in the situations which provoke these emotions and the behaviors 
they lead to, they cannot accept a thick description account of the reference 
of emotion terms. For ‘fear’ and ‘anger’ are terms in English and, as we 
saw earlier, the thick description theory entails that if a mental state does 
not share most of the causes and effects of anger that are commonly 
known among English speakers, then that state does not count as an in­
stance of anger. Also, though the point is less important for our purposes, 
since evolutionary psychologists sometimes claim that there are terms syn­
onymous with English emotion terms in languages whose speakers have 
folk psychological theories that are significantly different from ours, they 
cannot accept an opulent description theory of the meaning of emotion 
terms. Being unable to accept thick description theories of meaning and 
reference is hardly a major embarrassment for evolutionary psychologists, 
since those theories are far from the only games in town. And among the 
alternatives available, there are some—most notably causal/historical the­
ories of reference (Putnam 1975, Devitt and Sterelny 1987)—that would 
enable evolutionary psychologists to say what they want to say about the 
universality of emotions while not in the least contesting that Lutz and 
others have demonstrated that ethnopsychologies differ quite substantially 
from one culture to another.
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6. Who’s Right, and Why It Doesn’t Matter. W hat we have argued in the 
previous section is that the dispute between social constructionists and 
evolutionary psychologists over the universality o f the emotions could be 
generated by a philosophical (or semantic) disagreement about the mean­
ing and reference o f ordinary language emotion terms. We also suggested, 
albeit more tentatively, that this philosophical disagreement is largely re­
sponsible for the dispute, though the point has gone almost entirely un­
noticed by partisans on both sides. If we are correct, then the next obvious 
question to ask is: W ho’s right? Does the thick description theory give the 
correct account o f the meaning and reference o f commonsense mental 
state terms, or is the correct account to be found among one o f the com­
peting theories on which an emotion term may refer to a mental state even 
if  much of what the relevant folk psychological theory claims about the 
state is not true? These are questions that are being hotly debated in the 
philosophical literature, and we will not even try to answer them here.9 
Indeed, one of us has argued at some length that there is an im portant 
sense in which the questions cannot be answered until those debating them 
get a lot clearer than they are now on what facts a theory o f reference 
must answer to and thus what counts as getting a theory o f reference right 
(Stich 1996, Ch. 1).
This might sound like bad news, since if we cannot determine who’s 
right about reference we cannot settle the debate about the universality of 
the emotions. But we are inclined to  be rather more optimistic since, for 
two rather different reasons, it really doesn’t much matter who’s right. The 
first reason why it really doesn’t m atter is that if the debate about the 
universality o f the emotions is indeed driven by disagreements about 
meaning and reference, then the debate is largely isolated from the rich 
bodies o f empirical and theoretical work done by social constructionists 
and evolutionary psychologists. As we saw earlier, the social construc­
tionist argument for the cultural locality o f the emotions is entirely inde­
pendent of any claims about the psychological mechanisms underlying the 
emotions. Thus a social constructionist who accepts a thick description 
theory of meaning and reference could perfectly well remain agnostic 
about, or even endorse, a model like Levenson’s and still conclude that the 
emotions are culturally-local. All th a t’s needed is the premise that eth- 
nopsychologies vary significantly from culture to culture. And this, as we 
have seen, is not a premise that evolutionary psychologists are in the least 
inclined to dispute. Quite the opposite; biosocial models like Levenson’s 
are built to accommodate such diversity. But this is no impediment at all 
to evolutionary psychologists who want to insist on the universality of 
emotions. For they can simply adopt an account of meaning and reference
9. E.g. Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996, Lycan 1988, Griffiths 1997, Recanati 1993.
Copyright © 2000. All rights reserved.
152 RON MALLON AND STEPHEN P. STICH
on which an emotion term in English can refer to mental states in some 
other culture even if the ethnopsychology in that culture is significantly 
different from our own. If we are correct, it is the implicit adoption of a 
thick description theory on one side and an implicit rejection of it on the 
other which has given rise to the widespread perception that there is a 
substantial empirical dispute. On our view, this gives rise to the situation 
depicted in Figure 3.
The second reason why we think it doesn’t much matter who’s right is 
that, even on the contested issue of universality, no matter who is right 
about meaning and reference each side could perfectly well say what it 
wants to say, with the help of a bit of technical terminology. So, for ex­
ample, if it turns out that a thick description theory gives the correct 
account of the reference of ordinary language emotion terms, then evo­
lutionary psychologists must concede that fear and other emotions are not 
universal. Rather, there is a whole family of distinct emotions which are 
subserved by the same innate emotion prototype and affect program that 
subserve fear in us. But if we introduce a technical term to refer to all of 
these emotions—core-fear, perhaps—then the evolutionary psychologists
Recruited
Cultural learning: 
Display and feeling rules
The referent of 
'fear' for Social 
Constructionists
The referent of 'fear' 
for Evolutionary 
Psychologists
Figure 3. Will the real fear please stand up?
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who have conceded that fear is not universal can go on to claim that core­
fear is universal. And that, surely, is all they ever wanted to claim.
Once it is seen how the debate over the universality of the emotions is 
rooted in a dispute about the meaning and reference of emotion terms, 
and how little it matters who is right in that dispute, it may be much easier 
for evolutionary psychologists and social constructionists to  stop seeing 
each other as adversaries and start seeing each other as natural allies in 
the attem pt to understand the emotions. We believe it is time for this odd 
couple to stop the philosophical quarreling and to recognize how com­
patible their theories are and how nicely they complement each other.
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